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Abstract
This paper performs a cross-country level analysis on the impact of the level of
specific youth minimum wages on the labor market performance of young
individuals. We use information on the use and level of youth minimum wages, as
compared to the level of adult minimum wages as well as to the median wage (i.e.,
the Kaitz index). We complement these data with variables on the employment,
labor force participation, and unemployment rates of 5-year age interval
categories—all derived from the official OECD database. We distinguish between
countries without minimum wages, countries with uniform minimum wages for all
age groups, and countries with separate youth and adult minimum wages. Our
results indicate that the relative employment rates of young individuals below the
age of 25—as compared to the older workers—in countries with youth minimum
wages are close to those in countries without minimum wages at all. Turning to the
smaller sample of countries with minimum wages, increases in the level of (youth)
minimum wages exert a substantial negative impact on the employment rate for
young individuals.
JEL Classification: J21, J23, J31
Keywords: Youth minimum wages, Employment, Labor supply, Cross-national
studies
1 Introduction
One common finding in the empirical literature is that young individuals are rela-
tively strongly affected by the imposition of minimum wages, both by raising their
income level and by decreasing their employment—see, e.g., Clemens and Wither
(2016), Kalenkoski (2016), Neumark and Wascher (2007), Neumark et al. (2014)
and Laporsek (2013) for recent contributions.1 Uniform minimum wages may also
reduce on-the-job-training opportunities and discourage younger individuals from
entering the labor market. Particularly since the onset of the Great Recession, this
delayed entry into the labor market may have reduced individuals’ lifetime stream
of earnings (Carcillo et al., 2015).
With this in mind, policymakers may consider the use of specific youth minimum
wages instead of uniform minimum wages that are equal for all ages. Youth minimum
wage rates are typically set as a fraction of the adult minimum wage, with systems ran-
ging from single minimum wage rates for all young workers below a certain age (as in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal) to step-wise functions of an individual’s calendar age (as in
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the UK, Australia, and The Netherlands) (see Table 6 in the Appendix for details on
the implementation of youth minimum wage systems).
Although there is abundant empirical work on the employment effects of general
minimum wages on young individuals, studies on the specific effect of youth minimum
wages on youth employment are scarce. So far, findings for single countries provide in-
conclusive evidence; they are largely dependent on the specific context and to identify-
ing assumptions and usually only focus on the short-term impact of changes in youth
minimum wages. Typically, this literature exploits reforms or discontinuities of systems
in specific countries. For the UK, Dickens et al. (2010, 2014) and Fidrmuc and Tena
(2013) use regression discontinuity designs to estimate the impact of a 20% increase of
the minimum wage on the 22-year-olds. Dickens et al. find positive employment effects,
whereas Fidrmuc and Tena find evidence of negative or no employment effects. For
New Zealand, Hyslop and Stillman (2007) perform a difference-in-differences analysis
to compare the employment results of young workers who experienced changes in their
relative minimum wages (16–17- and 18–19-year-olds) with young adults whose mini-
mum wage rates remained unaffected (20–25-year-olds). Their results indicate insignifi-
cant employment effects for both affected groups. Finally, Olssen (2011) studies the
impact of a 10% minimum wage increase on workers aged 15–21 in Australia. He finds
no effect of the changes in youth rates on short-run youth employment.
This paper is the first to perform a cross-country level analysis that explicitly fo-
cuses on the impact of the level of specific youth minimum wages. As such, we
add to the analyses of Neumark and Wascher (2004) and Dolton and Bondibene
(2012), who exploit cross-country variation in general minimum wages of OECD
countries to estimate employment on young and adult individuals. Both these stud-
ies find that the presence of youth minimum wages reduces the detrimental impact
that general minimum wages may have on employment rates. In the current paper,
we contribute to this line of research by investigating how the level of youth mini-
mum wages—as compared to the adult minimum wage or the median wage—af-
fects the employment rate, the labor force participation, and the unemployment
rate of younger individuals. Contrasting to the earlier analyses, we thus exploit
variation in the use and level of minimum wages across ages within countries.
For our analysis, we follow 30 OECD countries, out of which 21 have implemented
minimum wages, between 2000 and 2014. Using information from governmental statis-
tics and OECD publications, we are able to define the use and, if relevant, the level of
youth minimum wages compared to uniform minimum wages and to the median wage.
More specifically, we construct series of youth rates by recording the level of wage that
is eligible at each age. We complement these data with data on the employment, labor
force participation, and unemployment level of 5-year age interval categories—all de-
rived from the official OECD database. Our focus is on cross-country differences in the
age profiles of employment, labor force participation, and unemployment rates that can
be explained by the use of uniform and youth minimum wages. By controlling for inter-
acted country and year fixed effects, we effectively compare the relative labor market
position of young individuals with the relative labor market position of young individ-
uals in other countries. In doing so, the key assumption we need to make is that mini-
mum wage settings are not correlated with other labor market institutions that
determine labor market outcomes of young individuals. We therefore restrict our
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sample to young individuals below the age of 35; this setup corresponds to a regression
discontinuity design wherein young individuals may face similar youth policies but are
either located to the left or the right of the age cutoff-point that determines whether
youth or adult minimum wages prevail.
To investigate the effect of minimum wages, we first compare the differences in the
relative labor market performance of individuals below the age of 25 between the three
country groups. In line with the analyses of Neumark and Wascher (2004) and Dolton
and Bondibene (2012), we find the relative employment of young individuals below the
age of 25—as compared to older individuals between the age of 25 and 35—in countries
with youth minimum wages to be similar to the employment rates of their peers in
countries without statutory minimum wages. However, employment rates are substan-
tially lower for young individuals in countries that employ uniform minimum wages.
We next zoom into the sample of the 21 countries that set statutory minimum
wages—either uniform or age-specific. Using fixed effects for all possible combina-
tions of countries and years, we compare the relative labor market position of
young individuals (vis-à-vis older ones) who are exposed to youth minimum wages
with the relative labor market position of their peers that receive adult rates. We
specify youth minimum wages as a fraction of both the adult minimum wage and/
or the median wage in a particular country. Following this strategy, the use of a
specific youth minimum wage rate exerts a positive and statistically significant ef-
fect on the employment rate of young individuals for whom it applies. In particu-
lar, a 1 percentage point increase in the youth minimum wage as a fraction of the
median wage—i.e., the “Kaitz index”—causes the employment rate of young indi-
viduals to decrease with 0.72 percentage points. We also find positive labor force
participation effects of youth minimum wages, which suggests the mitigation of
discouraged-worker effects that prevail with uniform minimum wages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description
of the data sources and the construction of our variables. Section 3 explains the empir-
ical strategy, whereas the estimations results and robustness analyses are discussed in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We use data derived from databases and from OECD publications. Data on labor
market outcomes, including the employment to population ratio, labor force par-
ticipation, and unemployment rate, are acquired from the OECD Statistics Data-
base.2 These variables are measured as (unweighted) averages of 5-year age
intervals for 30 OECD countries followed between 2000 and 2014.3 We comple-
ment these data with information on the incidence and level of adult and youth
minimum wages, as derived from OECD Employment Outlook reports of 1998 and
2015, Eurostat and governmental information sources.4
With these data, we compare country groups that are stratified with respect to the
presence of statutory national minimum wages (or not) and the presence of youth
minimum wages (or not). In effect, we have four country groups in our sample that
may overlap in some cases: countries with statutory minimum wages (group 1), coun-
tries without statutory minimum wages (group 2), countries with specific minimum
youth wages at some point in time (group 1A), and countries with uniform statutory
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minimum wages at some point in time (group 1B).5 For each country and year, we con-
structed the following variables:
i. A dummy value that indicates whether an age category is subject to youth
minimum wages or not. This fraction is equal to one for the age categories that
receive a youth minimum wage and zero across all age categories in countries
without youth minimum wages as well as for the rest of the age categories for
which the adult minimum wage applies in countries with youth minimum wages.
ii. The level of the youth minimum wage rates as a percentage of the adult minimum
wage. This variable is used in our main analysis where we concentrate on the group
of countries with national minimum wages; it is equal to 1 for the age categories
that are eligible for an adult minimum wage. In countries with uniform minimum
wages, all age categories are assigned with “1”.
iii. The level of the (youth) minimum wage rate relative to the median wage—i.e., the
Kaitz index. Again, this variable concerns the group of countries with legally
binding minimum wages and is used in the main analysis. Where a youth minimum
does not exist, this variable is equal to the uniform minimum-to-median wage.
As the labor market data we use are measured at the level of 5-year age inter-
vals, we need to transform the above variables into 5-year age interval values as
well. For this purpose, we assume equal relative weights of five consecutive years
in an age interval. Thus, for intervals where we observe a change of the youth into
the adult minimum wage at a particular age, we compute the weighted average of
variable values before and after the minimum age for which the adult minimum
applies.6
Table 1 categorizes the countries into groups 1, 2, 1A, and 1B. In our sample, 21 out
of 30 OECD countries had statutory minimum wages in the period under investigation
(i.e., group 1). These include most of the European countries, as well as Canada,
Australia, Japan, Korea, Turkey, and the USA. Group 2 includes countries without
statutory minimum wages, namely the Nordic countries, Italy, Austria, and
Switzerland.7 More relevant to our study is the lower part of Table 1, which concen-
trates solely on countries of group 1 and further categorizes them into those that em-
ploy lower youth rates (group 1A) and those that do not (group 1B). Two countries,
Belgium and Greece, appear in both groups 1A and 1B at the same time, since they did
not have specific youth minimum wages in the full time period under investigation.
Belgium phased out specific youth wages during 2013–2015, whereas Greece intro-
duced them in 2012.
Figure 1 reveals substantial variation in the level of minimum wages across countries
in group 1. The real average hourly minimum wage level for the period 2000–2014 was
less than 3 US dollars in the Slovak Republic and Estonia, while it exceeded 10 US dol-
lars in France, Australia, and Luxembourg. In this respect, it should be noted that taxes
and other non-wage labor costs may significantly affect the net wage (or “take home
pay”) as well as the cost of labor for employers. It is estimated that the total tax burden
from social contributions and other obligatory payments for OECD countries reaches
nearly one third of gross minimum wage, on average, with the shares being almost
equally paid by employers and workers (OECD, 2015).
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Almost half of the OECD countries with a statutory minimum wage use specific
minimum wages for young workers. Figure 2 illustrates the relative youth rate as a
ratio of the adult rate and of the median wage at each age for workers aged 15 to
25, measured in 2014. In countries like Australia and the Netherlands, the
Table 1 Classification of countries on minimum wage systems (2000–2014)
Group 1: Countries with statutory minimum
wages (Ν1 = 21)
Group 2: Countries without statutory
minimum wages (Ν2 = 9)
Australia Luxembourg Austria
Belgium Netherlands Denmark
Canada New Zealand Finland
Czech Republic Poland Germany
Estonia Portugal Iceland
France Slovak Republic Italy
Greece Spain Norway
Hungary Turkey Sweden
Ireland UK Switzerland
Japan USA*
Korea
Classification of group 1 according to youth rates
Group 1A: Countries with minimum
wages and youth rates
Group 1B: Countries with uniform
minimum wages
Australia New Zealand Belgium Hungary
Belgium Portugal Canada Japan
Greece Slovak Republic Czech Republic Korea
Ireland Turkey Estonia Poland
Luxembourg UK France Spain
Netherlands Greece USA
*USA is considered in our data as a country without youth minimum wages, since the lower rates are associated with job
tenure. When we include the USA in the data as a country with uniform minimum wages, our results are
virtually identical.
Fig. 1 Average hourly adult minimum wages, $US 2014 PPP
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minimum wage for young workers is specified as a step-wise increasing function of
the worker’s age. In particular, it starts at a very low age, usually at 15 and ap-
proximately at 30% of the adult wage while it gradually increases till the age of 23.
In contrast, a single subminimum for young workers exists in Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal. In other countries, such as the UK or the Slovak Republic, the youth rate
involves up to two youth rates for age groups of young workers for whom the
adult minimum wage does not apply.
As a first eyeball test of minimum wage effects, Fig. 3 plots the employment rate per
age category for our four country groups, averaged over all years in our sample.8 The
upper panel of each graph compares the average outcomes in countries with statutory
minimum wages (group 1) with those without statutory minimum wages (group 2); the
lower panel of each graph compares the average outcomes for countries with youth
minimum wages (group 1A) with those with uniform minimum wages (group 1B).
Countries without minimum wages have higher employment rates than those with
minimum wages. This is particularly true for individuals below the age of 25. Interest-
ingly, we also find marked differences between the employment outcomes of younger
workers in countries with youth minimum wages and those with uniform minimum
wages. Differences in employment rates between groups 1A and 1B are more promin-
ent for younger ages than for older age groups, suggesting that youth minimum wage
may have an impact on labor market outcomes.
3 Model specification
To estimate the effect of youth minimum wages on youth employment, we start with
an exploratory investigation on the effect of uniform and youth minimum wages on
young individuals’ relative labor market outcomes below the age of 25, as compared to
Fig. 2 Share of youth minimum wage rate to the adult minimum wage rate and to the median wage rate
as a function of age, 15–25 years old (measured as shares; 2014)
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those aged between 25 and 35. More specifically, we compare the relative employment
rate, labor force participation rate, and the unemployment rate of individuals below the
age of 25 in countries without statutory minimum wages to those with uniform statu-
tory minimum wages and to those with youth-specific minimum wages. The concern-
ing model that describes labor market outcomes is specified in a linear fashion:
yi jt ¼ β0 þ β1 UMWD jt  Iði≤2Þ þ β2 YWD jt  Iði≤2Þ þ AGEi
þ COUNTRY YEAR jt þ ui jt
ð1Þ
where, yijt is the labor market outcome of interest—i.e., the employment rate, labor
force participation rate, or the unemployment rate—for age category i (i = 1,..4) in
country j (j = 1,..,J) in year t (t = 1,.,T). The variable UMWDjt represents a dummy on
Fig. 3 Average employment rate per age category for countries with statutory minimum wages (group 1)
and without statutory minimum wages (group 2) and for countries with youth wages (group 1A) and with
uniform wages (group 1B)
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uniform minimum wages, which assigns “1” to countries that have uniform minimum
wages in year t and “0” to countries without national minimum wage systems as well as
to countries with youth minimum wages in year t. Likewise, YWDjt represents a
dummy that is equal to 1 if a country uses youth specific minimum wages in a particu-
lar year, and 0 otherwise. Our model also includes fixed effects for all possible combi-
nations of countries and years. As such, we cannot estimate model parameters for the
effect of (youth) minimum wages across all age categories.
The main coefficients in model (1) are β1 and β2. These parameters describe the im-
pact of having a uniform minimum wage and a youth minimum wage on the first two
age categories that consist of individuals of 15–20 years and 21–25 years of age, re-
spectively. The parameter values can thus be interpreted as the relative labor market
performance of young individuals in countries with uniform and youth minimum
wages, as compared to the relative labor market performance of their peers in countries
without statutory minimum wages. Finally, the error term uijt is assumed to be identi-
cally and independently distributed. We can estimate model (1) with interacted country
and year fixed effects, while allowing for clustering effects at the level of countries.
In the second model, we concentrate on the group of countries that employ a na-
tional minimum wage to estimate the effect of the level of youth minimum wages on
the outcome variables. We thus compare the group of countries with specific youth
rates (group 1A) with the group that implements uniform minimum wages (group 1B).
Again, we exploit differences in relative outcome variables between young individuals
who are affected by the policy of youth minimum wages and the relative outcome vari-
ables of their peers who are not exposed to lower rates. This yields the following model
for labor market outcomes:
yijt ¼ β0 þ β1 YMDijt þ β2 YMWijt þ AGEiþ
COUNTRY YEARjt þ vijt ð2Þ
where yijt is the labor market outcome of interest for age category i in country j in
year t. The variable YDijt represents the “youth minimum dummy,” which assigns “1”
to the relevant age categories that receive less than the adult minimum wages in those
countries where lower youth rates exist, and “0” otherwise. The variable YMWijt is the
youth rate expressed as a fraction of the adult minimum wage for the age categories for
which the youth minimum applies; for those for whom the youth minimum does not
apply, the value is normalized to “1”. By including YMWijt, we can test whether the
youth minimum wage effects are proportional to the relative level of youth minimum
wage—that is, β2 is the quasi-elasticity of youth minimum wages on the outcome meas-
ure of interest. As an alternative to the relative level of youth minimum wages as com-
pared to the adult rate, we also present model outcomes with the youth minimum
wage measured as a fraction of the median wage—i.e., the Kaitz index. Similar to Eq.
(1), we also assume vijt to be identically and independently distributed. We estimate the
model with country and year fixed effects and allow for standard errors that are clus-
tered across countries.
4 Estimation results
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results of Eq. (1) for the employment rate, labor
force participation rate, and the unemployment rate as outcome measures. Since Eq.
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(1) does not require specific information on the level of minimum wages and the mini-
mum age of adult minimum wages (if relevant), we can estimate this model for all
countries in our sample. Table 2 suggests that the relative performance of young indi-
viduals below the age of 25 in countries with a uniform minimum wage is worse than
their peers in countries without statutory minimum wages (which is used as a reference
group). More specifically, they are less likely to be employed and less likely to partici-
pate in the labor market, with negative effect estimates of about 14 percentage points
and 16.5 percentage points, respectively. Interestingly, these negative effects of a mini-
mum wage are insignificant when (lower) youth minimum wages apply. Individuals
below the age of 25 for which a subminimum applies perform equally well with their
peers in the group of countries with no legal minimum wages (as compared to individ-
uals older than 25).
In line with Dolton and Bondibene (2012), these findings indicate that a uniform
minimum wage across all ages may provide an incentive to employers to cut down em-
ployment of young individuals. Moreover, the results could be explained by the exist-
ence of discouraged-worker effects; youths who expect that finding a job will be
difficult because of the existence of a binding minimum wage are more likely to with-
draw from the labor market, typically by prolonging their time in education.
Next, we focus on the group of countries with minimum wages—including both with
youth rates (group 1A) and with uniform minimum wages (group 1B) and on individ-
uals below the age of 35. Table 3 reports the corresponding results, which are based on
the estimation of Eq. (2) for the employment, labor force participation, and unemploy-
ment rates. For each of these outcome measures, we estimate a model specification that
includes youth minimum wage dummies as well as a model specification with both
youth minimum wage dummies and proxies for the relative level of youth minimum
wages, i.e., the youth-to-adult minimum wage and the youth-to-median wage ratios—-
see columns (ii), (iii) and (iv).
Again, the outcomes of model specifications with only the youth minimum wage
dummy reveal that young individuals in countries with youth minimum wages gen-
erally exhibit better labor market outcomes than those in countries that employ
uniform minimum wages. When including the youth-to-adult minimum wage rate
Table 2 Estimation results of model [1]; N = 1740
Employment
rate
Labor force participation
rate
Unemployment
rate
Uniform minimum wage and age below
25
−14.28***
(3.80)
−16.53***
(4.14)
5.62*
(2.86)
Youth minimum wage and age below 25 −5.72
(5.37)
−6.34
(5.98)
2.90
(2.93)
Country-year
Fixed effects (Number of FE: 300)
YES YES YES
Age dummies YES YES YES
Intercept 31.11***
(2.90)
37.66***
(3.12)
0.15
(7.65)
R2 0.916 0.894 0.676
Note: Standard errors, which are clustered at the level of countries, are shown in parentheses
*/*** indicate significance at the level of 10%/1%
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or the youth-to-median minimum wage rates, however, these dummy effects turn
insignificant. This suggests that employment and labor force participation effects
are proportional to both of these measures. From the coefficient estimate of the
youth-to-median rate, we infer that the employment rate of young individuals de-
creases by 7.2 percentage points if the youth-to-median rate would increase with
10 percentage points. These coefficient effects are considerably bigger than those
obtained by Dolton and Bondibene (2012), but comparable to those by Laporsek
(2013).
From the estimates of the model specifications that include both youth minimum
wage fractions, the picture that emerges is that the Kaitz index does a better job
in explaining employment rate effects than the youth-to-adult minimum wage rate.
Given that the average youth-to-adult minimum wage rate is 0.81 for whom it ap-
plies in our sample, a 10 percentage point increase in the youth-to-median rate
corresponds to a 12.3 percentage point increase in the youth-to-adult rate. Based
on our findings, the employment rate of young individuals would decrease by 5.6
percentage point due to the raise vis-à-vis the median wage and another 2.0 per-
centage point due to the raise vis-à-vis the adult minimum.9 Stated differently, the
impact of a raise of the youth minimum wage would be 5.6 percentage points if
adult minimum wages would be increased proportionally.
5 Conclusions
This study employs cross-national data from 30 OECD countries and for the time
period 2000–2014 in order to explore the effect of introducing lower wages for
young individuals on their labor market performance. Essentially, the identification
follows from comparing the relative performance of individuals eligible for youth
minimum wages with their peers in countries where this policy does not apply.
Our results indicate that both the relative employment and labor force participa-
tion rates of individuals below the age of 25 are about 10 and 12 percentage points
higher, respectively, in countries with youth minimum wages, as compared to
countries with uniform minimum wages. Moreover, the effects are found to be pro-
portional to the level of the youth wage, with an impact of an increase of the
youth-to-median minimum wage of 1 percentage point that is equal to a decrease
in the employment rate of 0.72 percentage point.
In line with earlier research, our results point at employment effects of minimum
wages that are relatively large for younger individuals. Still, the effects we find are
also considerably larger than those obtained from cross-country analyses that have
been conducted by Neumark and Wascher (2004) and Dolton and Bondibene
(2012). One explanation for this may be that our analysis is the first to use the
exact level of youth minimum wages to explain the employment rates of younger
individuals, rather than general minimum wages that are only a crude measure to
detect minimum wage effects for young individuals. Accordingly, our estimates are
less susceptive to attenuation bias. Related to this argument, it is important to
stress once more that our research strategy exploits variation between age groups
within countries and years to estimate youth minimum wage effects. By comparing
young individuals below and above the age cutoff that gives eligibility to adult
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minimum wages, we are able to detect displacement effects that would have been
left unnoticed if one would exploit variation between countries instead.
That being said, there might be room for improving the estimation youth mini-
mum wage effects in some ways. Even though our data are the first to exploit
country-level data on statutory youth minimum wage settings, there still might be
variation in non-statutory or local settings that cause measurement error. In line
with this, more detailed analyses that incorporate other institutional settings may
help in deepening our understanding of minimum wage systems and their effect
on youth labor markets. This particularly applies to labor standards, the design of
education systems, opportunities for part-time work, union coverage, and employ-
ment protection legislation. All these institutions may affect the extent to which
individuals and employers respond to minimum wage settings. Finally, for policy-
makers, it is of key importance to compare the employment effects of youth mini-
mum wages with the income effects due to lower wage earnings for younger
employed individuals.
Endnotes
1An exception to this is Card and Krueger (1994), who do not find employment
effects for young workers. Consecutive research largely challenged their findings—-
see, e.g., Burkhauser et al. (2000) and Neumark and Wascher (2000).
2Following standard definitions, the labor force includes all individuals that are classi-
fied either as employed or unemployed. The labor force participation rate is defined as
the share of labor supply of the total population between 15 and 65 years of age; un-
employment and employment rates as expressed as shares of the labor supply.
3As we lack information on (youth) minimum wages for Chile, Israel, Mexico, and
Slovenia, these countries are excluded from the sample.
4Table 6 in Appendix 2 provides a detailed overview of the sources on youth mini-
mum wage systems.
5Note that some of these countries—including the USA, Japan, and Canada—have
minimum wage settings that vary across localities. We argue that measurement prob-
lems stemming from this are probably limited if we relate youth to adult minimum
wages, as this yields fractions that are less prone to measurement errors. In countries
with uniform minimum wages, measurement errors will even be zero. Irrespective of
the exact level of minimum wages, the young-to-adult minimum will then be equal to
one in all localities.
6For instance, suppose the adult minimum wage applies to individuals of 22 and
older. For the interval between 20 up to and including 24, we then have relative weights
that are equal to 40 and 60%, respectively.
7Note that Germany has adopted a statutory national minimum wage policy since
2015.
8Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix 1 provide more detailed information on the employment
rates, labor force participation rates, and unemployment rates of countries.
9The coefficient estimate of the youth-to-adult minimum wage on the employ-
ment rate is − 0.16. Thus, the isolated impact of a youth minimum wage raise is
12.3 × − 0.16 = − 2.0 percentage point.
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Appendix 1
Table 4 Labor market performance variables, 15–64 age of population for selected years (2000,
2010, and 2014)
Countries Employment rate Labor force participation rate Unemployment rate
2000 2010 2014 2000 2010 2014 2000 2010 2014
Group 1
Australia 67.1 71.7 70.9 71.6 75.7 75.6 6.4 5.6 6.6
Belgium 57.3 60.3 60.2 61.7 66.0 66.0 8.4 10.9 11.1
Canada 68.4 70.7 71.6 73.5 77.0 77.1 7.2 8.7 7.6
Czech Repub. 62.9 63.5 66.0 68.9 68.6 70.5 10.5 10.6 9.4
Estonia 60.3 60.3 67.3 70.7 72.6 72.8 16.2 20.8 9.2
France 58.7 62.9 63.3 65.4 69.5 70.4 11.3 11.1 12.1
Greece 55.7 56.2 46.6 62.7 64.8 64.4 12.7 15.5 30.4
Hungary 54.0 53.3 60.0 57.7 60.2 65.2 7.5 14.6 11.2
Ireland 63.9 58.5 59.3 66.9 67.8 67.7 4.7 15.7 14.6
Japan 67.7 68.7 71.1 71.3 72.6 74.0 5.7 5.8 4.0
Korea 61.1 61.2 63.4 64.0 63.8 65.9 5.4 4.9 4.6
Luxembourg 58.2 61.2 62.5 59.7 64.1 66.7 2.8 6.1 8.5
Netherlands 69.0 74.2 72.7 71.3 77.8 78.6 3.2 4.8 7.9
New Zealand 69.1 72.4 74.5 73.6 77.5 79.1 6.5 7.4 6.6
Poland 53.1 58.0 60.1 63.2 64.2 66.3 17.5 11.5 11.9
Portugal 67.2 62.7 60.2 70.1 71.0 70.9 4.6 13.6 18.5
Slovak Repub. 54.5 57.1 58.9 66.5 66.6 67.9 20.8 18.4 17.4
Spain 54.7 55.4 52.2 63.4 69.9 70.4 14.4 23.5 29.6
Turkey 48.1 44.7 47.9 50.9 50.5 53.1 5.7 11.4 9.8
UK 70.2 68.9 70.9 74.5 75.1 76.0 6.0 9.0 7.5
USA 71.9 65.6 67.2 75.0 72.8 71.8 4.4 10.7 7.1
Average 61.6 62.3 63.2 66.8 69.0 70.0 8.7 11.5 11.7
Group 2
Austria 65.2 68.4 68.9 67.7 72.1 73.1 4.0 5.1 5.9
Denmark 74.2 72.9 72.3 77.9 79.1 77.6 4.6 7.9 7.2
Finland 65.3 68.3 68.5 72.6 74.8 75.2 10.9 9.9 10.0
Germany 64.6 69.0 71.9 70.2 74.5 75.9 8.1 7.6 5.5
Iceland 84.8 78.6 82.0 86.8 85.2 86.5 2.4 8.0 5.4
Italy 51.6 53.7 52.4 57.8 59.2 61.0 12.2 12.5 19.2
Norway 75.6 74.9 74.8 78.5 77.8 77.6 4.1 4.1 3.9
Sweden 71.9 72.3 74.1 76.6 79.2 80.7 7.0 10.6 10.1
Switzerland 76.6 77.4 78.5 78.8 81.3 82.4 3.0 4.8 4.9
Average 70.0 70.6 71.5 74.1 75.9 76.7 6.3 7.8 8.0
Note: Group 1 includes countries with statutory, uniform minimum wages and group 2 includes countries without
statutory minimum wages
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Table 5 Labor market performance variables, averages per group of countries and age category,
2000–2014
Groups and age categories Employment rate Labor force participation rate Unemployment rate
Group 1
15–19 19.6 24.9 26.9
20–24 53.7 63.7 16.5
25–29 74.2 82.5 10.1
30–34 77.2 83.7 7.8
35–39 78.6 84.5 6.9
40–44 79.4 85.0 6.5
45–49 78.0 83.2 6.2
50–54 72..6 77.3 6.1
55–59 58.4 62.0 5.9
60–64 34.0 35.7 4.7
Average 62.6 68.3 9.7
Group 2
15–19 36.0 42.4 18.2
20–24 63.7 71.7 11.7
25–29 76.8 83.0 7.7
30–34 82.2 87.2 5.7
35–39 84.4 88.6 4.8
40–44 85.2 89.1 4.4
45–49 84.5 88.1 4.2
50–54 81.1 84.7 4.2
55–59 70.8 74.3 4.7
60–64 44.0 45.8 4.0
Average 70.9 75.5 7.0
Group 1A
15–19 24.9 31.0 25.7
20–24 55.6 65.4 16.0
25–29 74.7 82.7 9.8
30–34 77.6 83.8 7.5
35–39 78.3 83.8 6.5
40–44 78.5 83.6 6.1
45–49 77.0 81.6 5.7
50–54 71.4 75.6 5.6
55–59 57.6 60.8 5.3
60–64 34.5 36.0 4.2
Average 63.0 68.4 9.2
Group 1B
15–19 11.4 15.5 29.7
20–24 49.3 60.2 18.7
25–29 73.2 82.8 11.5
30–34 76.7 84.2 8.7
35–39 79.0 85.7 7.8
40–44 80.2 86.5 7.2
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Appendix 2
Table 6 Youth minimum wage systems for selected OECD countries
Country Youth
minimum
wages
Youth rates Sources/references Remarks
Australia Yes 15: 36%
16: 47%
17: 57%
18: 68%
19: 82%
20: 97%
▪ Australian Government, Fair
Work Ombudsman
Australia is a country that
implements multiple youth
rates across the time span
of our data.
Belgium Yes < 16: 70%
17: 76%
18: 82%
19: 88%
20: 94%
▪ National Labour Council of Belgium
▪ Plasman, R. (2010). EEO Review:
Youth Employment Measures
Belgium. Brussels: European
Employment Observatory.
▪ Cockx, B. (2013). Youth
Unemployment in Belgium:
Diagnosis and Key Remedies,
IZA Policy Paper No. 66, Bonn:
IZA.
▪ OECD. Economic Surveys:
Belgium 2015. Paris: OECD
▪ ILO Legal Databases (Acts
CCT No 43 and No 50 that
define the youth rates for
workers below the age of
21):
▪ Collective agreement No.
43 of 2 May 1988 concerning
the amendment and
consolidation of Collective
agreements No. 21 of 15 May
1975 and No. 23 of 25 July
1975 on the guaranteed
minimum wage as modified
to November 1998
▪ Collective Agreement on
the Guaranteed Minimum
Wage for Workers Younger
Than 21 Years, Agreement
No. 50 of 29 November 1991.
The youth minimum wages in
Belgium were phased out during
the period 2013–2015.
Accordingly, Belgium appears in
the data as a country
that implements youth rates
until 2012.
Canada No ▪ Government of Canada
▪ Shannon, M. (2011). The
Employment Effects of
Lower Minimum Wage
Rates for Young Workers:
Canadian Evidence, Industrial
Relations: A Journal of Economy
and Society, 50(4): 629–655.
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
Reduced rates in Canada were
abolished prior to our data.
The country is treated as a
country with no youth rate
implementation.
Table 5 Labor market performance variables, averages per group of countries and age category,
2000–2014 (Continued)
Groups and age categories Employment rate Labor force participation rate Unemployment rate
45–49 78.6 84.5 6.9
50–54 72.9 78.2 6.8
55–59 57.6 61.6 6.5
60–64 31.5 33.2 5.1
Average 61.0 67.2 10.9
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Table 6 Youth minimum wage systems for selected OECD countries (Continued)
Country Youth
minimum
wages
Youth rates Sources/references Remarks
Czech Republic No ▪ OECD. Economic Survey: Czech
Republic 2014. Paris: OECD
▪ Pavel Janicko (2012). Youth
Employment in the Czech Republic.
Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung: Czech
Republic.
The lower minimum wage rates
were not applied based on
discrimination grounds. Any lower
rates concern only those aged
18–21 and employed for the first
time, reaching the 90% of
minimum wage and for the first
six months of employment. Thus,
they are not taken into account in
our analysis.
Estonia No ▪ Statistics Estonia No reduced rates.
France No ▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
Lower wages for young workers
in France is associated with job
tenure. For example, those with
up to 6 months experience and
aged below the age of 17 are
eligible to 80% of the adult
minimum wage. For this reason,
France is treated as a country
with no specific youth wages.
Greece Yes < 25: 89% ▪ Yannelis, C. (2014). The Minimum
Wage and Employment Dynamics:
Evidence from an Age Based Reform
in Greece. Royal Economic Society
Annual Conference.
▪ Annual Report on the Greek
Economy and Employment 2013,
Employment Institute GSEE (Η
Ελληνική Οικονομία και
Απασχόληση, Ετήσια Έκθεση 2013:
ΙΝΕ ΓΣΕΕ)
Greece introduced youth specific
minimum wages after 2012.
Hungary No ▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
▪ OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary
2014
No reduced rates. OECD proposes
the introduction of lower rates to
fight high youth unemployment
and facilitate school-to-work
transition (OECD, 2014).
Ireland Yes < 18: 70% ▪ Citizens Information: Rights of
young workers
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
In case of Ireland, it is strictly
stated that “young people under
the age of 18 are only granted
up to 70% of the national
minimum wage”.
Japan No ▪ OECD Economic Surveys: Japan
2015
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
The regional minimum wages do
not appear to be a problem for
the analysis since there are no
specific youth wages to be
considered in this case.
Korea No ▪ Republic of Korea, Minimum Wage
Commission
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
Any lower rates are associated
with job tenure (for those up to
6 months of tenure and under
age of 18, the rate is 90%). Thus,
Korea is treated as a country that
does not use lower rates.
Luxembourg Yes 15–16: 75%
17: 80%
▪ The Official Portal of the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
Luxembourg has been
implementing lower youth rates
during the reference period.
Netherlands Yes 15: 30%
16: 34%
17: 39%
18: 45%
19: 52%
20: 61%
21: 72%
22: 85%
▪ Government of the Netherlands
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
The Netherlands has been using
multiple youth wage rates
throughout the time period
of our analysis.
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Table 6 Youth minimum wage systems for selected OECD countries (Continued)
Country Youth
minimum
wages
Youth rates Sources/references Remarks
New Zealand Yes Multiple
changes
over the
years
▪ Employment New Zealand
▪ Hyslop, D. and Stillman, S. (2007).
Youth Minimum Wage Reform and
the Labour Market in New Zealand.
Labour Economics, 14(2): 201–230.
▪ Hyslop, D. and Stillman, S. (2011).
The Impact of the 2008 Youth
Minimum Wage Reform.
Unpublished, Labour and
Immigration Research Centre, New
Zealand
During 2001–2008, the adult
minimum wages applied to all
those above the age of 18. From
2008, the adult wage applies to
those above 16 years. From 2013,
the minimum starting-out wage
replaced the minimum wage for
new entrants and the training
minimum wage for trainees under
20 years of age.
Poland No ▪ OECD Economic Surveys: Poland
2016
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
No reduced rates.
Portugal Yes < 18: 75% ▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015
Lower wages for workers below
the age of 18 throughout the
reference period.
Slovak Republic Yes < 18: 80%
18–21: 90%
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015 Lower wages for workers below
the age of 21.
Spain No ▪ Blazquez et al. (2009), Minimum
Wage and Youth Employment Rates
in Spain: New Evidence for the
Period 2000–2008, Economic
Analysis Working Paper Series,
Autonomous University of Madrid.
▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998
No reduced rates.
Youth wages in Spain were
abandoned prior to the
beginning of the reference period
of our data. Before that, the lower
wages concerned those below
the age of 18 and amounted up
to 89% of the national wage.
Turkey Yes < 16: 85% ▪ OECD Employment Outlook 1998 Turkey has introduced lower
wages for workers below the age
of 16.
UK Yes Multiple
changes
over the
years
▪ Gov.uk: National Minimum Wage
and National Living Wage Rates
▪ Dickens, R., Riley, R., and Wilkinson,
D. (2010). The Impact on
Employment of the Age Related
Increases in the National Minimum
Wage. Report prepared for the Low
Pay Commission. London: Low Pay
Commission.
▪ Dickens, R., Riley, R., and Wilkinson,
D. (2014). The UK Minimum Wage at
22 Years of Age: A Regression
Discontinuity Approach. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, 177(1):
9–114.
▪ Fidrmuc, J. and Tena, J. d. D (2013).
National Minimum Wage and
Employment of Young Workers in
the UK.” CESifo Working Paper, No.
4286.
UK has implemented various
youth rates across the years.
Using the governmental source,
we have captured all these
changes across age categories
and years.
USA Yes < 20: 58% ▪ OECD Employment Outlook 2015 The lower wage for young
workers in the USA is associated
with job tenure. Analysis is
repeated with and without the
US data and the results are
robust.
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